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Abstract 
Examinations of trust have advanced steadily over the past several decades, yielding important 
insights within criminal justice, economics, environmental studies, management and industrial 
organization, psychology, political science, and sociology. Cross-disciplinary approaches to the 
study of trust, however, have been limited by differences in defining and measuring trust and in 
methodological approaches. In this chapter, we take the position that: 1) cross-disciplinary studies 
can be improved by recognizing trust as a multilevel phenomenon, and 2) context impacts the nature 
of trusting relations. We present an organizing framework for conceptualizing trust between trustees 
and trustors at person, group, and institution levels. The differences between these levels have 
theoretical implications for the study of trust and that might be used to justify distinctions in 
definitions and methodological approaches across settings. We highlight where the levels overlap 
and describe how this overlap has created confusion in the trust literature to date. Part of the overlap 
– and confusion – is the role of interpersonal trust at each level. We delineate when and how 
interpersonal trust is theoretically relevant to conceptualizing and measuring trust at each level and 
suggest that other trust-related constructs, such as perceived legitimacy, competence, and integrity, 
may be more important than interpersonal trust at some levels and in some contexts. Translating 
findings from trust research in one discipline to another and collaborating across disciplines may be 
facilitated if researchers ensure that their levels of conceptualization and measurement are aligned, 
and that models developed for a particular context are relevant in other, distinct contexts. 
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As noted throughout this volume, trust is a critical concept across a wide array of domains. 
Within specific domains of research, prominent models of trust have been established. For example, 
in organizational scholarship a common method for the conceptualization and measurement of trust 
has been identified (the benevolence-integrity-ability model of trust; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995). This model holds that the trustworthiness of an individual is dependent on his or her 
benevolence, integrity, and ability in the eyes of another. The model has been used in systematic 
reviews of the antecedents and outcomes of trust in organizational settings (Colquitt, Scott, & 
LePine, 2007). In the study of risk management, research has begun to converge on a singular 
conceptualization and measurement of trust (Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2010). And in law, criminal 
justice, and policing contexts, the highly trust-relevant Legitimacy Theory is dominant (e.g., Gibson, 
Caldeira, & Spence, 2005; Tyler, 2006). 
Cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of trust, however, have been limited by a lack of 
attention to the ways in which context impacts the nature of trusting relationships between 
individuals and groups. Specifically, research has failed to consider the ways in which the 
expectations of trustors and trustees differ as one moves from one domain of study to the next. 
Reflecting recognition of the importance of context, McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) advocated the 
development of “a generalizable theory of context that explains when and under which conditions 
different components of trust are more or less relevant” (p. 41). To be sure, previous research has 
examined impacts of contextual factors on trust. For example, Pirson and Malhotra (2011) examined 
trust from the perspective of a variety of stakeholders and demonstrated that the dimensions of 
perceived trustworthiness vary depending on the nature of the stakeholder group examined. Scholars 
also have conceptually examined the multi-level nature of trust and its impact on the measurement of 
trust to provide insights into the ways in which trust manifests when examined across multiple levels 
of analysis (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). Specifically, in their analysis and review of several studies 
within the business domain, Currall and Inkpen found that the level of theory and level of 
measurement were misaligned in several studies. That is, the level of theory was often the trust 
between firms, but the level of measurement was often between people and firms (see Table 7.1). 
  
Table 7.1 
 
Institution as 
trustee 
(formal or informal 
organization, 
system, or 
mechanism of social 
order)  
A person trusting an institution. 
 
Examples: People’s trust in courts; schools; 
banks; the media; a political party; the military; 
the education system; the prison system; 
insurance companies; different levels of 
government.  
A group trusting an institution.   
 
Examples: An interest group’s trust in the 
legislative branch; a town’s elected officials’ 
trust in the National Guard; a group of company 
managers trusting the company for which they 
work. 
An institution trusting another institution.   
 
Examples: Corporations trusting banks; 
banks trusting the Federal Reserve; the 
executive branch recognizing the legitimacy 
of and authority of the legislature; the 
education system trusting in the courts. 
  
Group as trustee 
(relatively small set 
of identifiable 
people) 
  
  
A person trusting a group.   
 
Examples: An individual’s trust in one’s 
colleagues; trust in one’s church leaders; trust 
in one’s family.  
A group trusting another group. 
 
Examples: An association of professionals 
trusting their leadership committee; the 
offensive line trusting the defensive line on a 
particular sports team; inter-firm cooperation 
and collaboration. 
An institution trusting a group.  
 
Examples: A health maintenance 
organization’s (HMO) trust in a group of 
healthcare providers; a company trusting its 
management team; the military trusting its 
commanders. 
  
  
Person as trustee 
(one individual) 
  
  
A person trusting another person. 
 
Examples: A person trusting another to honor a 
contract; a husband trusting his spouse; an 
employee trusting her manager.  
A group trusting a person. 
 
Examples: A group of managers trusting their 
corporate attorney; a particular school’s parent-
teacher association members trusting the 
school’s principal; an interest group trusting a 
particular politician.  
An institution trusting a person.   
 
Examples: Governmental agencies trusting 
individuals to contribute to governmental 
decisions in the context of public 
participation; the Supreme Court trusting its 
chief justice; the executive branch trusting 
the president. 
  Person as trustor 
(one individual) 
  
Group as trustor 
(relatively small set of identifiable people)  
Institution as trustor 
(formal or informal organization, system, or 
mechanism of social order) 
 
  
In this chapter, we recognize the multiple levels at which trust might be relevant. Table 7.1, 
to which we will refer throughout this chapter, illustrates the matrix of trustee-trustor relationships at 
three broad levels. However, we seek to further illuminate how trust at multiple levels might 
manifest, by also considering the contextual factors at each level. In particular, we consider trust at 
the individual, group, and institutional levels, and consider each of these levels in the public and 
private domains. For example, do the same antecedents of trust in private organizations (e.g., for-
profit corporations) also apply to trust in public institutions (e.g., Congress)? Do trustors in private 
organizations such as corporations have the same expectations about the trustee as trustors who are 
making trust judgments about a governmental entity such as Congress? How are these dynamics 
impacted when multiple individuals make up a collective trustor? Or when multiple individuals 
comprise a collective trustee? Answering such questions will be critical if a multidisciplinary 
understanding of trust is to emerge. While this chapter is unable to examine all possible contexts in 
which trust plays a role, we hope that this overview will provide a conceptual foundation to inform 
future research. 
Trust Across Levels of Analysis 
We begin with a commonly-accepted cross-domain definition of trust put forth by Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998): “A psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395). For 
further discussion of the applicability of this definition of trust across various domains, see Hamm, 
Lee, Trinkner, Wingrove, Leven, & Breuer (this volume). They analyze trust as a single construct vs. 
one that is fundamentally different across various domains, including public administration, policing, 
the courts, and healthcare. For the purposes of the present chapter, we proceed with this definition as 
relevant for the cross-domain study of trust. 
Again, we assert that it is important to consider the cross-level implications of trust. That is, 
how might trust differ depending on whether the trustors and trustees are a collective rather than 
individuals? Therefore, rather than utilizing the specific domain (such as policing, healthcare, etc.) to 
illustrate our framework, we first focus our attention on the level of analysis that is invariant across 
the numerous domains in which trust is applied in this volume. For instance, the person-to-person 
level of trust could occur in both the policing and healthcare contexts. Person-to-person trust can be 
illustrated by one police officer trusting another police officer, or with one physician trusting a 
nurse. Similarly, trust can be relevant in the group-to-group level by, for example, a particular unit of 
officers trusting a particular group of police leaders. Institution-to-institution trust can be 
demonstrated in an interaction where a state-level executive agency interacts with a state-level 
appellate court. As noted above, previous research has considered such implications in the context of 
international joint ventures (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). There, the authors theorized about how to 
measure and conceptualize trust using a 3×3 matrix of individuals, small groups, and firms (see our 
Table 7.1 for a conceptually similar matrix – ours is not specific to business but rather is intended to 
be applicable in both public and private domains).  
Research has demonstrated that there are differences in the nature of trust depending on the 
level in which it is measured. For example, interpersonal and interfirm trust differ in important ways 
in the buyer-seller context, each playing different roles in affecting negotiating processes and 
exchange performance (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). To use the 
benevolence-integrity-ability model to illustrate, negotiations between two individuals may be based 
on the benevolence and integrity of the trustee, while negotiations between firms may be based more 
strongly on the ability and integrity of the trustee firm. Further, even while interpersonal trust 
between individuals in two different firms might be strong, interfirm trust might be relatively weak 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994). These findings only begin to highlight the myriad relationships in which 
trust might be relevant and how trust might differ across different levels. Additionally, the results 
suggest a need to explore the ways in which individual- and group-level dynamics impact the 
conceptualization and measurement of trust. 
The context in which individuals, groups, or organizations operate will dictate whether and 
how individuals, groups, and organizations trust one another. For example, in an organizational 
setting, employee trust in a supervisor may differ from employee trust in a small work group, or trust 
in the board of directors. In the realm of government, citizen trust in a particular elected official 
might differ substantially from citizen trust in the institution of which the elected official is a 
member. In the U.S. this phenomenon is nicely illustrated as public trust in individual members of 
Congress is consistently higher than trust in Congress at large, a phenomenon identified by Hibbing 
& Theiss-Morse (1995), and as discussed by Campos-Castillo et al. (this volume). In this particular 
situation, it may be possible that interpersonal aspects of trust may be driving trust in individual 
legislators (i.e., the left-most, bottom box of Table 7.1: person-to-person trust) while something 
other than interpersonal trust is driving trust in the institution (i.e., one of the other eight boxes in 
Table 7.1). Studies suggest that measures of confidence in Congressional leaders as individuals or in 
Congress as an institution as a whole capture different attitudes; the former are better predicted by 
party identification and ideology, whereas the latter stem more from social status and institutional 
attachment (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). As another example of why these various levels may 
matter, consider that when multiple agencies collaborate to tackle public problems, trust between 
individuals within agencies (i.e., person-to-person, person-to-institution) may be high, while trust 
between small groups within each organization (i.e., group-to-group) may simultaneously be low.  
To illustrate the measurement implications of the multilevel perspective of trust, it may be 
worth considering a number of examples. The Person–Group–Institution distinctions represented in 
Table 7.1 are not necessarily mutually exclusive, thus adding another layer of complexity to the 
study of trust from a methodological perspective (see Figure 7.1). This complexity may be evidenced 
in public opinion polls and surveys that assess trust. For instance, when survey administrators ask 
respondents about “trust in Congress,” some respondents might report their trust in Congress as an 
institution while others might respond based on their trust in a particular legislator. Likewise, in 
surveys of employees in organizational settings, assessments of trust may be driven strongly by 
assessments of supervisor trust for some individuals, but driven by assessments of trust in the larger 
workgroup or organization for others.  Therefore, while a large amount of trust research focuses on 
elements of interpersonal trust (i.e., trust between individuals), our 3×3 matrix illustrates that 
interpersonal trust is not always relevant. Although aspects of interpersonal trust may be relevant for 
most of the levels, it is likely not relevant at the “institution-to-institution” level (i.e., the right-most 
upper box of Table 7.1, and the “institution” area of Figure 7.1 that does not overlap with the 
“person” or “group” areas). Interpersonal trust is relevant when the trustee is a person trusting 
another person or trusting a group, because groups are composed of identifiable people – but trust in 
groups may nevertheless have a different character than person-to-person trust. Interpersonal trust is 
similarly relevant when the trustee is a group trusting an individual person or another group. 
However, when an institution is the trustee or trustor, “interpersonal” trust does not fit well 
conceptually. Other trust-related constructs, such as perceptions of trustee legitimacy, competence, 
benevolence, shared values, and impartiality may be more important at this level (see Figure 7.1).  
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Let us revisit Rousseau et al.’s (1998) cross-domain definition of trust with the 3×3matrix of 
trustee-trustor relationships in mind. The “willingness to accept vulnerability” arguably makes sense 
for each of these levels, but in different ways. Trust may be best understood in terms of interpersonal 
vulnerability at the person level and to some degree at the group level. There is choice involved in 
the willingness to be vulnerable in interpersonal trust. But at the institutional level (where 
“interpersonal” trust seems ill-fitting), trust is about willingness to cooperate and comply in order to 
preserve social order. From a Lockean perspective, there is “choice” involved in an abstract sense in 
that citizens in democracies give tacit consent to be governed by the constitutional systems, policies, 
norms, and so forth that have been created over the years.1 Once trust in such institutions has eroded 
to the point that citizens no longer feel their liberties are being protected by such institutions, 
individuals could simply relocate, or attempt to establish a new constitutional order. From a purely 
theoretical perspective, then, attempting to apply common conceptualizations of trust to the study of 
trust in public institutions may be problematic. In the next section, we consider some of the 
distinctions between public and private domains that may inform the conceptualization and 
measurement of trust.  
Trust Across Domains and in Private and Public Contexts 
Much of the recent research on trust has originated out of the organizational behavior and 
management fields. Thus, much of what we know about the dimensions of trust, the impacts of trust 
on attitudes and behaviors, and the mediating role of trust between attitudes and behaviors has been 
developed by researchers working in organizational settings (e.g. Kramer, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995) 
where trustees and trustors are typically involved in an employee–employer relationship.  
Trustor–trustee expectations in the employee-employer relationship may be shaped by the 
norms, customs, and policies that govern behaviors in various settings. For example, the 
development of trust between two employees who occupy similar places in the hierarchy of a 
manufacturing firm may be shaped by nature of their employment and the relationship between one 
another’s work. The development of trust between an employee and a supervisor in the same firm 
may be shaped by role differentials, which might manifest in expectations about the obligations of 
the employee to meet the needs of the supervisor. Further, employee trust in the “company” or 
organization may be shaped by the employee’s understanding of his or her place in the company 
hierarchy and shaped by previous experiences with the individuals who comprise the leadership of 
the firm. In each of these scenarios, the trustor and trustee understand the roles of each other in the 
particular workplace context. Moreover, each likely understands the broad legal framework guiding 
employment which shapes the expectations of individuals and groups across the organizational 
hierarchy. Simply put, in organizational settings where trustors and trustees are also the employee 
and employer, each individual and collective has specific rights and obligations that guide behavior. 
However, it may be useful to distinguish employment in private settings to employment in 
public settings. In recent years, a robust literature on public service motivation has emerged (see 
Perry, 1996). Public service motivation theory holds that individuals pursue providing service in 
public settings as a result of a number of factors such as: commitment to public interest, civic duty, 
social justice, self-sacrifice, and compassion (Perry, 1996). At the heart of this theory is a general 
understanding that individuals who seek employment in public agencies may have a unique set of 
motivations that are somewhat distinct from their counterparts who seek employment in private, for-
profit organizations. In particular, public sector employees may have different reward motivations 
and may have higher levels of organizational commitment (Crewson, 1997). While relatively little 
research to date has examined the role of trust in shaping public service motivation, recent studies 
have suggested that trust may be an important factor of public service motivation. For instance, 
Chen, Hsieh, and Chen (2014) argues that interpersonal trust between colleagues is an important 
source of knowledge sharing in public settings, and that public employees’ trust in citizens can 
enhance opportunities for more citizen participation in governmental decision-making. In sum, the 
lack of a profit motive and perhaps a greater emphasis on democratic norms may lead trust to play a 
slightly different role in public employment versus private employment settings. Moreover, the 
unique aspects of public employment may introduce unique trust relationships (i.e. governmental 
employees trusting citizens) that are not necessarily found in private, for-profit enterprises. 
Consequently, the study of trust across public and private employment settings may prove to be a 
fruitful line of research by allowing scholars to test whether models of trust developed in one domain 
retain their predictive validity in other domains. 
Trust at Multiple Levels in Democratic Contexts 
Outside of workplace settings, many of the situational norms, customs, and policies 
associated with employment disappear, or are replaced by others. This is particularly true as we 
consider the public realm of democratic societies. Democratic societies provide for varying levels of 
public input into the decisions made by public officials. To apply Rousseau et al.’s (1998) definition 
of trust to democratic societies, we can surely see that citizens do accept vulnerability to decision 
makers on a consistent basis. For example, unlike in many private contexts (e.g. employment, 
contractual relationships, etc.) in which the trustor may have limited voice—or even a limited 
expectation of voice—individuals in public settings are often entitled to make their voices heard. In 
general, citizens in democratic societies can make their voices heard through such methods as 
voting, participation in interest groups, direct contact of public officials, etc. Indeed, citizens in 
democratic societies have a wide array of avenues through which to impact the decision making of 
public officials. Therefore, while vulnerability to decision makers exists for citizens in a democratic 
society, the level and nature of the vulnerability that individuals or groups might feel is quite 
different from the vulnerability felt by individuals and groups engaged in at-will employment or 
business enterprises. In short, citizens in a democratic society have an opportunity to shape the 
behaviors of the public officials tasked with governing (though, of course, historical and political 
factors may lead to variation in the extent to which certain citizens believe they have the ability to 
impact the behaviors of officials).  
It is important to recognize that the public sphere is not unidimensional. Within the public 
sphere there are multiple institutions, each of which may evoke varying expectations regarding the 
role between the citizen and the state. To again use the American context as an example, each 
federal governmental institution was specifically designed to produce different expectations from 
citizens. Theoretical perspectives put forth in the Federalist Papers, outline the ways in which the 
American founders intended governmental institutions and citizens to interact. 2 While we know that 
many intentions of the founders and the political system they developed were not actually 
implemented in practice, the Federalist Papers provide a useful way for beginning to understand 
how specific design features of the U.S. Constitution might affect expectations about government 
performance, much like the design features of a private firm might affect employee or investor 
expectations about performance.   
Regarding the executive branch of the federal government, Publius indicates in Federalist 
#68 that the presidency should be elected not by the average citizen but by members of the electoral 
college, a body of citizens separate from, and not beholden to, the general electorate (Hamilton, 
1788). Subsequent papers make the case for a vigorous executive that has the power to act 
unilaterally in some instances, particularly in matters dealing with national security. With regard to 
federal courts, Publius favored an even greater distance between citizens and the government, 
arguing that judges should be appointed by the president—who is not to be directly elected by 
citizens—and should hold office while demonstrating good behavior. Even within the legislative 
branch—the branch closest to the people—Publius argued for a clear distinction between the Senate 
and the House of Representatives: Senators were to be elected by state legislatures while House 
members were to be directly elected by the public. Across the four most visible federal institutions, 
then, citizens were originally asked to put their faith in the individuals occupying and institutions 
governing the presidency, the courts, and the Senate, and were given little recourse in the event that 
trust was violated. Only the members of the House of Representatives would be threatened in the 
case of a breach of trust under the original laws of the U.S. Constitution which allowed for direct 
election of representatives. While Constitutional amendments and interpretations of laws have 
altered the original blueprint offered by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, it is clear that the 
difference in the nature of governmental entities may generate differences in the expectations of 
citizens across governmental branches. 
To illustrate, consider governmental entities such as legislatures, where expectations about 
obligations to the institution may be nonexistent given that citizens in many democratic nations are 
not required to help select legislators, let alone pay attention to their activities. Rather, trust in the 
institution may be shaped by the democratic expectation that the legislature will more or less act in 
accordance with the public’s will. Here, trust may be developed as citizens observe individual 
legislators address the needs of the people and perform at their job over time. If trust in legislators 
deteriorates enough over time, citizens have the ability to vote against the legislators in question; 
thus, there is a fairly strong incentive for legislators to develop citizens’ trust. 
Democratic institutions such as judicial and executive branches may foster the development 
of trust differently than legislative branches given the relative autonomy of these entities. Trial 
courts—those with which citizens come into contact most often—may have the effect of developing 
relational trust between citizens and representatives of the court since citizens are likely to have 
some sort of contact with these courts at some point in their lives (Tyler, 2006). Appellate courts—
which are oftentimes appointed positions far removed from citizens—may not have the same impact 
upon relational aspects of trust, but may instead be judged based on citizens’ judgments about past 
performance and future expectations. And the nation’s highest court, the U.S. Supreme Court, is the 
furthest removed from citizens. Given this distance, considerations of trust in the U.S. Supreme 
Court is perhaps most usefully conceptualized as perceptions of “legitimacy” rather than 
interpersonal trust (see e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, & Baird, 1998). 
In the U.S. and other nations with a federal form of government, the relationship between 
citizens and government is even more complex. Federal forms of government, where multiple layers 
of government have the authority to carry out specific functions, require that citizens must attend to 
a variety of governmental actors. In the U.S., for example, this means that citizens have a unique 
relationship with a federal legislature (House of Representatives and the Senate), a state legislature 
(in most cases an upper and lower state house), and a local legislature (such as a city council). This 
multi-layer situation also exists with relation to the executive (e.g., president, governor, and mayor) 
and the judicial branches (e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court, a state court, and a local district court). To 
even further complicate matters, trust is implicated in the multitude of bureaucratic agencies such as 
departments of motor vehicles, environmental quality agencies, and health and human services—
typically part of the executive branch of government—that citizens tend to actually interact with on a 
day-to-day basis. 
All told, citizens in nations with a federal form of government will develop a unique trust 
relationship with each of these governmental entities, some of which they will come into contact and 
many others that they will not. The variety of governmental institutions in federal republics such as 
the U.S. dictate that scholars must fully understand the nature and purpose of each institution if true 
evaluations of trust in such institutions are to be assessed and measured. Furthermore, scholars must 
critically examine whether specific models of trust that are relevant in one context are general and 
flexible enough to be applied in other contexts. 
Trust at Multiple Levels in Other Non-Governmental Group Contexts 
In many democratic societies, voluntary associations provide another common way for 
individuals and groups to operate in the public sphere. Voluntary associations—be they professional 
(e.g. trade associations), civil (e.g. religious organizations), or political (e.g., lobbying groups)—play 
an integral role in public life. The prevalence and importance of such groups in the U.S. was noted 
very early in American history by de Tocqueville who traveled extensively throughout the U.S in the 
early 1830’s. In his view, voluntary associations were an essential part of American life that helped 
extend democracy in important ways (de Tocqueville, 1835/2012). Today, while participation in 
voluntary associations has declined to a degree (Putnam, 2000), they still play an important role in 
promoting democratic ideals, providing support for individuals, and pressuring government to adopt 
certain policies. 
In many pluralistic societies, voluntary associations are private in nature, but serve in quasi-
public roles. In the U.S., for example, voluntary associations such as the Sierra Club3 are operated as 
private, non-profit entities that enjoy preferred government status via the tax code. Such 
organizations operate as a typical private organization with a hierarchical leadership structure. 
Consequently, the trust relationship within non-profit organizations is likely to mirror that of many 
of other private, for-profit entities, where there are typically employee-employer relationships. But 
the Sierra Club and other non-profits are unique in that they typically have a donor or member 
network that is not employed by the organization but that provides support by way of financial and 
other resources. As noted by Olson (1965), interest groups offer selective benefits to members to 
encourage them to stay active in the organization and to continue to offer support. The presence of 
donors and outside contributors to non-profits introduces a novel trust relationship between 
individual donors and the organization as a collective. In general, organizations trust individual 
members to continue to donate resources, while individual members trust the organization to provide 
meaningful networking and recreational opportunities. The exchange of selective benefits for the 
promise of donations serves as a contractual aspect to the relationship.  
In addition to serving as an expressive outlet for members, interest groups engage in 
lobbying activities to pressure government regulators to adopt policies that are beneficial to the 
environment, in the views of the organization. Again, individual members trust the organization to 
lobby governments and pursue policies that are consistent with the aims and goals of the 
organization and its members. In pressuring the government to take particular actions and by helping 
to develop public policy, the Sierra Club, for example, takes part in an advocacy coalition (Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith, 1988) of multiple lobbying groups that are interested in environmental issues 
including industry and trade groups, governmental actors, and the media. As such, the lobbying 
efforts implicate many aspects of trust that are studied in strategic management, particularly in inter-
firm cooperation (Schilke & Cook, 2015). Coalitions of interest groups pursuing the same policy 
goals must cooperate at the individual and organizational levels, and key individuals within co-
aligned organizations must have some level of interpersonal trust in order to coordinate activities. 
Further, the broader organizations (that take the form of a collective of individuals) must have some 
level of trust in order to pursue common policy goals. The same is true of trade and lobbying groups 
that work closely with government. In order to develop policy, trade and lobbying organizations 
must also work together to meet goals and objectives. Again, this implicates various facets of 
interpersonal and interorganizational trust between for-profit organizations, non-profit organizations, 
and various levels and branches of government.  
Discussion 
Thus far, we have outlined the multi-level and contextual factors that impact the study of 
trust in various settings. While the examples provided here touch on only a few of the myriad 
settings and situations in which trust is an important factor in interpersonal and interorganizational 
relations, the examples illustrate the many considerations that researchers must make when taking a 
cross-contextual and multiple-level view of trust.  
Previous research has shown that the dynamics of interpersonal trust and interorganizational 
or group-level trust are related but distinct constructs (e.g., Barney & Hansen, 1994; Doney & 
Cannon, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). Similarly, recent neuroscience research has demonstrated that 
the neural correlates of judgments about companies are somewhat different that those that underlie 
interpersonal judgments about people (Plitt, Savjani, & Eagleman, 2014). Despite the fledgling 
literature about the potentially important distinctions between the nature of trust at these different 
levels of analysis, Currall and Inkpen (2002) found that many studies of trust poorly theorize about 
and account for level of analysis in their measurements. The published studies they reviewed often 
theorized about the nature of trust in inter-group or inter-institutional levels, but measured trust at 
interpersonal levels. Although this finding might be cause for concern, other research suggests that 
separating perceptions of an institution from the individuals in the institution may not be very easy to 
do or even desirable as they may overlap considerably (see e.g., Colquitt et al., 2013).  
Let’s consider a simple example of how a cross-level understanding of trust is important. If 
the different levels of trust are important to the study of trust, the pronouns or instructions used to 
measure trust may matter. If trustors are asked to rate their trust in an institution with unclear 
pronouns or instructions, they may consider the entity itself or they may consider the people that 
comprise the institution – thus, the resulting measurements might not be consistently conceptualized 
by the respondents with an associated increase in measurement error. As one particular 
demonstration, people might be asked to rate how “caring” an institution is, such as the Federal 
Reserve. It might make a difference if people considers how the institution balances shareholder 
earnings vs. low interest rates to help the average consumer (i.e., an institution-level performance 
indicator of “care”) compared to if the trustor instead considered how warm and caring vs. cold and 
uncaring they found the new head of the reserve, Janet Yellen (i.e., more of an interpersonal-level 
indicator of trust) in making their rating. If the pronouns used in the measurement items or if the 
instructions were clear about the level the respondent should rate (entity vs. person), the error 
associated with the measurement might decrease.  
Additionally, the theoretical and empirical models used to measure trust must be carefully 
scrutinized before being used to conceptualize and measure trust across various settings. For 
instance, the benevolence-integrity-ability model of trust (Mayer et al., 1995) has been shown to 
have predictive ability in a variety of organizational settings (Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Bhattacherjee, 
2002). The benevolence-integrity-ability model of trust may also have utility in developing models 
of trust in governmental institutions. However, before applying such a model of trust to the study of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, researchers should consider the theoretical rationale for the 
organization of the Supreme Court, the resulting organizational features of the court, as well as the 
public’s understanding of the court that results from political socialization. Such a consideration may 
reveal that that the benevolence-integrity-ability model may not be appropriate, or that specific 
factors of the model—such as the integrity of the Supreme Court—are relevant to the study of the 
Supreme Court, while the others are not.  
Given these discrepant empirical findings in the literature about the similarities vs. 
differences in trust at these different levels (interpersonal, intergroup, inter-institutional) reviewed 
above, combined with the theoretically meaningful differences, we end this chapter with a call for 
further attention by trust researchers about whether and how the level of the trusting relationship 
affects the nature and measurement of trust. Ultimately, such attention may inform whether a 
singular model of trust can be applied at different levels and across public and private contexts, or 
whether the interactions between levels and situations yield such varied contexts, that a single model 
of trust is not feasible or appropriate for all settings. 
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Table and Figure Captions 
Table 7.1. Trustee-trustor matrix at three levels. 
Figure 7.1. Overlapping elements of multilevel trust. 
 
  
Notes 
                                                          
1 While the emphasis of this exercise is on democratic societies, we recognize that in many societies 
throughout the world vulnerability to an authority may be compulsory rather than voluntary. 
2 The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 essays written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, 
and John Jay in 1787 and 1788. The essays originally appeared anonymously in New York 
newspapers under the pen name “Publius.” The purpose of the papers was to urge the citizens of 
New York to ratify the new U.S. Constitution. They are considered a primary important source for 
understanding the original intent of the Constitution (Library of Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html). 
3 An environmental protection group dedicated to conserving and protecting wilderness areas, 
improving air and water quality, energy conservation, and protecting endangered species, 
http://www.sierraclub.org/about. 
